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Abstract
Environmental self-auditing by private firms is generally thought to both deserve
and require encouragement.  Firms can audit themselves more cheaply and
effectively than can regulators, but too often are deterred for fear that the
information they uncover will be used against them. To reduce this disincentive,
the EPA’s “Audit Policy” lowers punitive fines when firms promptly disclose
and correct violations that they themselves discover. While some contend that
the Audit Policy is inadequate, EPA touts its success, presenting as evidence the
policy’s track record to date. Yet our examination of that track record leads us to
question EPA’s conclusions. While the policy appears to have encouraged firms
to self-audit in a number of instances, a comparison of the violations uncovered
in these cases with those detected by standard enforcement practices suggests
that the typical self-audited violation is relatively minor. For instance, cases
arising under the Audit Policy are more likely to concern reporting violations,
rather than emissions. The relative insignificance of self-audited violations raises
a number of broader policy questions, including whether the Audit Policy could
and should be revised to play a larger role in regulatory enforcement.
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2Introduction
The growing technical and legal complexity of environmental regulation over the last
several decades has generated a new set of problems for both industry and regulator.2  One of the
most serious challenges arises from the tension that exists between the necessity that firms
conduct environmental “self-audits” and the disincentive that they face in doing so.
Regulatory complexity requires that firms affirmatively and systematically investigate their
own operations in order to insure that they are in environmental compliance.  To assure such
compliance at its four Texas facilities, for example, Occidental Petroleum must deploy a team of
technicians armed with sophisticated testing equipment to monitor 140,000 points for potential
fugitive emissions.  The resulting four to seven million pieces of data must then be organized,
summarized, and analyzed.3  Furthermore, Occidental Petroleum’s vigilance must extend beyond
‘the usual suspects’—e.g. pipe joints and valves—to encompass the possibility of emission from
unexpected sources such as routine spillage, or transfer and transport practices.
On the other hand, self-discovery of a compliance problem may well increase the chance
that the problem will be detected by the regulator—or at least firms may perceive this to be so.4
                                                          
2 Federal environmental regulations include the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERLA), Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA).  Add to this state
and local regulation and one gets a picture of a regulatory structure rivaling the tax system in complexity.  Its
complexity may surpasses that of the tax system when we take account of the fact that regulatory requirements  are
often of a highly technical nature, requiring sophisticated scientific equipment and skilled personnel.  Further,  unlike
statistics on income and payroll, the information is not of a kind that the firm would otherwise be keeping.
3 See Hawks (1998) and Lavelle (1992).
4 Murray (1995): “Corporate America is worried that the audit provides the regulatory agency, the Department of
Justice, or interested citizen groups with a paper trail that leads to expensive cleanup, fines, and possible criminal
culpability for the corporation, its officers, directors, and even its employees”.  Moore and Newkirk (1995):
“Substantial disincentives to self evaluation have existed because of …fear that the information will be used against
3A firm that uncovers ongoing noncompliance may not be able to simply fix the problem and
move on.  Its self-discovery may make more likely some punishment by the regulator for non-
compliance up to this point. The discovery of noncompliance by a disgruntled employee may
inspire that employee to “blow the whistle.” Even loyal employees may be subpoenaed to testify
against the firm under oath.  Further, documents and computer files generated in the course of a
self-audit may be subject to inspection as of right by future litigation opponents.  Alternatively,
such records may simply find their way into unmarked brown envelopes and onto desks at EPA.
That self-auditing produces more frequent penalties for noncompliance may appear to be
good for the regulator.  But this ignores the possibility that firms may respond by self-auditing
less frequently and less earnestly.  Facing a risk that self-investigation may produce “emissions
of evidence,” firms may well conclude that ignorance is bliss, or that too much self-knowledge
can lead to misery.  To the extent that fewer problems are uncovered as a result, compliance will
suffer.  A firm may, for instance, decide that it would actually rather not find out whether a
smokestack’s scrubber is faulty, if finding out that it is faulty makes it substantially more likely
that EPA will learn of the same shortly thereafter.  If the scrubber does indeed have a problem,
and if EPA’s unaided discovery of this fact is relatively unlikely or subject to significant delay,
the smokestack may continue to spew harmful emissions even though the firm could and would
fix the problem relatively cheaply but for its fear of shooting itself in the foot by self-auditing.
This tension between the necessity of self-auditing and its disincentive has been apparent
since at least the 1990’s.  In a number of well-publicized instances during that decade, firms
turned to regulators after discovering that some practice previously thought to be innocuous was
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the company.”   Feeley (1995): “A self-audit can become a ‘prosecutorial road map,’ allowing disclosure to be used
as an enforcement tool.”,  Cooney et al. (1995): “Environmental auditing is not used as frequently as it should be,
however, due in part to governmental reluctance to give formal protection to internal documents…”.
4in fact generating noncompliant emissions.5  Instead of receiving good citizenship awards for
identifying and correcting a problem that the regulators themselves may never have detected, the
firms found themselves subject to serious fines.  Stories such as these led to calls for protection
against punishment for violations uncovered as a result of self-auditing.6  First to react were the
states. Several created a new self-evaluative privilege whereby confidential documents produced
under a regular program of environmental self-auditing would not be subject to discovery and
would not be admissible as evidence in court. Others went so far as to propose immunity for
firms that voluntarily reported and corrected noncompliance.7
The United States EPA was more cautious.  EPA at first appeared reluctant to provide any
protection on the federal level.  At the same time, however, pressure continued to mount from
both below and above, with more states threatening to institute privileges or immunities and the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 A costly self-audit of Coors’ Golden, Colorado operations revealed that the spillage of beer in the course of the
manufacturing process was producing harmful—and illegal—ethanol emissions.  Subsequently, the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment sought to obtain over $1 million in fines from Coors, based on Coors’
own disclosure of its internal review—even though the agency never would have known of the violations but for
Coors’ own investigative effort.  For more detail, see, e.g., Feeley (1995).
6 The academic literature is in substantial agreement with industry commentators that firms face a disincentive to
self-auditing and that a policy response is warranted.  Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) show that standard liability and
negligence regimes adequately induce fixing of known violations, but yield inefficient levels of audits to uncover
those violations.  One solution they propose is to lower fines to the extent the firm’s own auditing aids regulators in
detecting violations.  Arlen (1994) analyzes the problem of vicarious corporate criminal liability and the incentive to
monitor employees.  She also proposes basing fines on firms’ monitoring efforts.  Arlen and Kraakman (1997)
extend Arlen’s model to the problem of monitoring employee activities that may have harmful environmental
consequences.  Kesan’s (2000) game-theoretic analysis suggests a need for attention to creating positive incentives to
self-police.  Finally, Innes’ work (1999a and b, 2000, 2001) suggests that for self-policing to be optimal (taking into
account savings in government enforcement), fine reduction is needed, even when not all violators report in an
optimal regime. If firms undertake detection avoidance activities, that also can raise the value of self-reporting.
7 For a regularly updated list, see the EPA Region 5 site: http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/audits/audit_apil.htm.
As of August 28, 2001, this EPA site lists as “Privilege Only” Arkansas, Indiana , Illinois, Mississippi and Oregon,
with the first such privilege laws enacted as early as 1993 (Oregon) and others being enacted in the mid-1990s.
As of the same date, the same EPA web site lists as having “Immunity Only” just one state, Rhode Island, but also
lists under “Privilege and Immunity” (in order of first enactment) Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Wyoming, Utah,
Texas, Kansas, Virginia,  Michigan, Idaho, South Dakota, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Ohio, Montana, Alaska,
Nevada, Nebraska, Iowa and Arizona.  The earliest laws were in 1994; new laws have arisen ever since.
5Administration insisting that federal agencies find ways to “reinvent government.”
The EPA response was to take what some regard as a partial step.  In 1995, EPA issued its
final policy on “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations” (60 FR 66,706).8   The policy is a “guideline” for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and the conduct of settlement negotiation.  It stipulates that the “gravity” component of
fines—as opposed to the “economic benefit” component9—will be reduced by 100% for a firm
that discovers a violation through a systematic auditing program, voluntarily discloses the
violation 21 days after discovery without prompting from government or a third party plaintiff,
corrects the violation within 60 days, takes steps to prevent recurrence, and cooperates with EPA
throughout.  The violation cannot be part of a pattern of repeated violations and cannot be one
that has caused or may cause “serious harm.”  Gravity fines are reduced by only 75% if the
violation was not discovered as part of a systematic program, but the other conditions are met.
The fifteen years or so since the EPA audit policy was first proposed have seen ongoing
debate among industry commentators, economists and legal scholars over whether the policy is
sufficient.10  Critics point to several shortcomings.  First, the policy is only a “guideline” for the
regulator in the field; the Policy contains no enforceable promise of fine reduction for the
disclosing firm.  Second, fine reduction is limited to the add-on gravity component of fines and
                                                          
8 A revised Final Policy Statement (FRL 6576-3) was issued effective May 11, 2000.  In terms of the legislative
history, note that while the Policy was first finalized in 1995, the basic audit policy was first proposed in 1986.
9 The economic benefit component of the fine is intended to capture, roughly, the dollar value of the economic
benefit that the firm has derived from its noncompliance to this point. It aims to remove a firm’s incentive to delay
the repair of discovered violations.  It is quite common in these cases for fines to be levied to eliminate economic
benefits, even after gravity-based fines have been reduced by 75% or even 100%.  EPA identifies three kinds of
economic benefit: 1) benefit from delaying pollution control expenditures; 2) benefit from avoiding pollution control
expenditures; and 3) benefit from an illegal competitive advantage.  See the Policy On Civil Penalties And
Framework For Statute-specific Approaches To Penalty Assessments, 14 ELR 30001 (February 16, 1984).
10 Virginia Morton Creighton, Comment: Colorado’s Environmental Audit Privilege Statute: Striking the
Appropriate Balance? 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 443, 461 (1996):  According to the [Coors Brewing Co.], industry
6does not apply to the economic benefit component.  Thirdly, there is uncertainty about the EPA’s
intentions regarding criminal prosecution for non-compliance.  Fourthly, fine reduction, such as
it is, requires as preconditions a series of “acts of contrition”:  the firm must promptly disclose
the violation, also promptly correct it, and then take whatever measures EPA sees fit to prevent
recurrence.  In light of these perceived shortcomings of the Policy, the pressure for broader action
continues to emanate from industry, the states and several members of Congress.11
EPA continues to maintain, however, that its audit policy is more than adequate.  Further,
EPA has consistently asserted that farther reaching “secrecy and amnesty” policies, such as those
adopted by some of the states, are seriously overbroad.  Indeed, it has even threatened to revoke
regulatory authority from states that adopt such policies concerning the treatment of audits.12
As one of the chief arguments in support of its own policy, EPA regularly touts the tally of
violations that have been self-reported since the audit policy was instituted.  For instance, in May
2000:  “use of the Policy has been widespread. As of October 1, 1999, approximately 670
organizations had disclosed actual or potential violations at more than 2700 facilities.”13
Yet even a closer look at the EPA’s own literature gives some cause for doubt about the real
scope of the program to date.  It is at least clear that not all of the “violations” uncovered under
                                                                                                                                                                                          
perceived EPA’s 1986 policy as “small comfort” and not as the “behavior-modifying stimuli” intended by EPA.
11 For the 105th Congress, see S. 860 and S. 1332.  For the 104th Congress, see S. 582 and H.R. 1047.
12 Concerning the EPA’s policy, the March 1998 Audit Policy Update quotes EPA testimony before the Senate: the
Audit Policy “is working extremely well in encouraging audits, disclosures, and corrections of violations.” This was
to support the audit policy and EPA’s  longstanding opposition to audit privileges and/or audit immunities.
Concerning state policies, the revised Final Policy Statement (FRL 6576-3, p.31) notes: “EPA recognizes that
States are partners in implementing the enforcement and compliance assurance program … EPA will generally defer
to State penalty mitigation for self-disclosures as long as the State policy meets minimum requirements”.  See, on
requirements, ‘Statement of Principles: Effect of State Audit / Immunity Privilege Laws on Enforcement Authority
for Federal Programs’, Memorandum from Steven A. Herman et al., February 14, 1997, www.epa.gov/oeca/oppa.
13 FRL 6576-3.  The excerpt here summarizes the evaluation of the audit policy carried out in the spring of 1998, the
preliminary results of which were published in the Federal Register on May 17, 1999 (64 FR 26,745).  Discussion of
these results can also be found in the Audit Policy Update, volume 4, number 1 (EPA, Spring 1999).
7the policy are significant regulatory breaches.  An EPA newsletter from March 1998, for
example, provides details about 600 particular violations at 314 facilities in 21 states, which
comprise a fair portion of the May 2000 numbers reviewed above.  It appears that 511 of these
600 violations consisted of GTE’s failure to notify state agencies and local fire departments of
the existence of batteries filled with sulfuric acid at 229 “telecommunications sites.”  Given that
little additional information is supplied in the newsletter, one may speculate that most of these
229 “sites” were something on the order of switching stations in GTE’s large wireline telephone
network, and that EPA counted each unreported battery in each station as a separate violation.14
Of course, that EPA may have overplayed these particular GTE violations is as anecdotal,
and thus just as inconclusive, as EPA’s own claims in support of its audit policy.  That the GTE
violations were apparently relatively insignificant does not imply that all or even most of the
other self-reported violations follow suit.  Fortunately, EPA makes comprehensive data on the
self-reported violations publicly available.  In this paper we take advantage of the availability of
this data in order to assess the success of EPA’s audit policy in a more systematic fashion.
We first show that the great majority of the violations that are reported to EPA under its
audit policy are indeed like the GTE case, in that they involve the failure to report or to inventory
hazardous materials.  In contrast, self-reporting of actual emissions has been rare.
Yet the fact that most self-reported violations concern reporting and inventory might simply
reflect the composition of all violations, self-reported or otherwise. To test this we compared
self-reported violations with those violations that EPA itself uncovered within its standard
                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 The other 89 violations were failures to have SPCC (Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure) plans for
diesel fuel, which along with notification of locals are required under the CWA in order to help prevent spills.  Note
that EPA (Spring 1999) pp.1,10 reports that “on the heels” of the GTE case, an agreement with ten other
telecommunications companies was reached, concerning 1,300 violations at over 400 facilities.  Once again it would
8enforcement activities.  The difference in composition is dramatic. As the table below conveys,
reporting and record-keeping violations constitute more than 90% of the violations uncovered
under the Audit Policy, but less than 18% of violations uncovered by standard procedures: 15
EPA Standard Audit Policy
Reporting/Record-keeping Violations16 17.0% 91.5%
Other (including emissions) Violations 83.0% 8.5%
Still, the disproportionate share of reporting violations in the audit docket does not settle
the issue of whether self-auditing violations are relatively insignificant.  A reporting violation
could be more severe than an emissions violation.  A reporting requirement may concern vast
quantities of severely harmful substances whose safe use requires disclosure to local authorities
in order that they may be adequately prepared to handle any spills.  An actual emission, on the
other hand, may be a slow leak of a marginally harmful substance.  Fortunately, a proxy for
violation severity that cuts across different classes of violations is readily available in the data:
EPA reports the fines imposed on the violator (prior to any reduction under the Audit Policy).
This measure of severity appears to confirm that self-audited violations are less significant.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 discusses the source and nature of our
data;  Section 3 the presents our empirical assessment of the EPA’s Audit Policy.  Finally,
Section 4’s discussion considers some possible interpretations of our results and concludes.
Data Sources
While Appendix 3 discusses at length how we arrived at the data sets used to produce the
tables below, here we briefly review the underlying data sources.  They are both from EPA. Both
                                                                                                                                                                                          
appear that EPCRA violations were predominant, and that the other violations again concerned SPCC plans.
15 This table summarizes Table 2A below.
9are lists of case records involving violations of environmental laws.  One concerns solely those
uncovered through the Audit Policy, and the other concerns all other recorded cases.
For violations uncovered under the audit policy, collectively denoted the “Audit Docket,”
hard copies of case files were furnished by the EPA for audit proceedings from 1994 to 1999.
From these hard copy case records we encoded for each audit case the Case Number, Case Name,
Law and Section violated. Also, using our best judgment, we chose the best match from the list
of Violation types used by EPA in their standard enforcement practices (see below).
These Audit Policy case records include two values for the fine imposed:  first, the proposed
penalty, as per standard EPA rules;  and second, the actual penalty, after the fine reduction for
having participated in the Audit Policy process. (Recall, that this reduction is not always a 100%
fine reduction of gravity penalties, and also that reductions do not apply at all to the economic
benefit portion of the fine).  The proposed penalty seems to be the better measure of severity of
violation, as it should reflect severity as would fines under standard enforcement procedures.17
We refer to the non-Audit-Policy cases as the Standard Docket, which EPA provides in two
parts, Administrative and Civil.18  The EPA provides electronic data for all cases under standard
enforcement/compliance procedures for all the Federal environmental laws and regulations.  The
data for each record include several fields:  Case Number (a unique identifier for each record),
                                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Specifically these are the violation types REP, TRI and NONOTE (see Appendix 2 for their definitions).
17 With very few exceptions, we know only the total fine, and not its gravity and economic-benefit components. If the
latter element is not correlated with severity, we could better infer severity from the former than from the total.  We
suggest below that the economic benefit is low for typical Audit docket cases. Thus, when comparing the fines, we
focus on comparisons of violations of the same law or same section, where benefits are likely to be comparable. Any
residual difference may be partially balanced if, for Audit cases, the gravity fines are higher relative to severity (see
the Discussion section). Note that we cannot observe any pre-fine negotiation or plea bargaining that occurred.
18 For economic purposes, these are similar. The distinction is only where the case is adjudicated: in the independent
judicial branch, or within the agency's own quasi-judicial system.  The Administrative docket is for cases heard in the
EPA’s “in-house court system”, where the “administrative law judge” is an agency employee. The Civil docket is for
cases that the EPA takes directly to the judicial branch, e.g. the Justice Department, to be tried in federal court. Here,
the penalties and/or injunctive relief may be higher, but the EPA clearly has less control over the outcomes.
10
Case Name, Law Violated, Section Violated, Violation type (using EPA’s encoding system),
Pollutants, Date Filed, Date Concluded, Judicial District, Court Docket Number, Assessed
Federal Penalty, Cost Recovery Awarded, and Result Code.  Some records involve multiple
violations (e.g., multiple laws and sections, though one penalty).  Most of these involve multiple
violations of the same law and section, but a small set involve violations of multiple laws. As we
discuss below (including in Appendix 3), this matters in particular for our penalty comparisons,
as we must in these instances apportion the single Assessed Penalty value among the violations.
Performance of the Audit Policy
How has EPA’s Audit Policy performed?  Certainly a number of firms have chosen to self-audit
and report under the Policy.  But the existence of some amount of self-auditing is an unqualified
success only if our benchmark is no self-auditing whatsoever.  We suggest that, instead, standard
EPA enforcement outcomes are a more appropriate benchmark.  The standard EPA enforcement
outcomes will presumably reveal the EPA’s allocation of effort in implementing compliance.
Thus, by comparing Audit Policy outcomes to standard EPA outcomes, we can test whether the
Audit Policy is combating the non-compliance that regulators regard as most meaningful.
Specifically, we will compare the Audit Policy cases to the standard cases in three ways.
First, we will examine the laws (and sections) that have been violated.  Second, we will examine
the types of violations (e.g., reporting versus emissions).  Finally, we will compare the penalties.
For interpreting our tables, Appendix 1 presents the acronyms for and descriptions of the laws, as
well as the sections numbers for and a brief description of the sections violated.  Also, Appendix
2 provides the list of violations types from EPA, providing a definition for each code and label.
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Comparing Laws and Sections Violated
Table 1A shows that in the Audit docket close to 70% of the violations were of EPCRA,
while another 15% were violations of RCRA and TSCA and only 6% were violations of CWA.
In contrast, the Standard Administrative violations fell under EPCRA only 10% of the time, and
EPCRA or RCRA or TSCA only 30% of the time, while over 25% of the violations fell under
CWA.  For each law, the fraction of Audit cases is statistically significantly different from the
fraction of Administrative cases.19  The Civil cases differ by any even greater degree from the
Audit cases (and they are also statistically significantly different from the Administrative cases):
over 50% of the violations are of CERCLA, and 20% are of CAA, with almost 14% being of
CWA, while very few cases are violations of EPCRA or of TSCA.
Table 1A
Table 1B, which shows the sections of each law that were violated, depicts the dissimilarity
even more starkly.  EPCRA Section 302 comprises close to 60% of the Audit violations, but
essentially does not appear in the two Standard dockets.  Further, the five sections that make up
almost 90% of the Audit violations make up less than 10% of Administrative and 5% of Civil.
                                                          
19 For instance, for ANOVA in a regression context (i.e., docket dummies) comparing Audit to Administrative, the
lowest t statistic on the docket difference is 2.5, next lowest is 6.2, and average t statistic across the laws is 25.2.
           Laws Violated by Docket
Audit Admin Civil
EPCRA 72.19% 10.62% 1.60%
RCRA 9.44% 13.28% 8.75%
TSCA 6.75% 7.98% 0.99%
CWA 6.61% 26.26% 13.93%
FIFRA 4.72% 8.02% 0.80%
CAA 0.15% 11.10% 20.65%
CERCLA 0.12% 7.69% 51.48%
SDWA 0.03% 14.99% 1.73%
MPRSA 0.00% 0.05% 0.06%
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Table 1B
Table 1C below tells the same story.  The CWA, Section 301 makes up about 10% of the
Administrative docket and about 5% of the Civil docket, but is essentially non-existent among
Audit cases.  Further, the Audit cases under CWA center on Section 311, which is far less
common in the Standard dockets   Finally, Table 1D shows that the sections in CERCLA and
CAA that are common in Civil violations simply are not present in the Audit Policy cases.
Laws and Sections Violated in the Audit Docket
Law Section Audit Admin Civil
EPCRA 302 58.03% 0.03% 0.00%
EPCRA 313 12.34% 4.82% 0.86%
RCRA 3010A 8.95% 0.13% 0.06%
CWA 311 6.56% 1.51% 1.42%
FIFRA 12A1C 4.73% 0.20% 0.00%
TSCA 5 3.22% 0.41% 0.00%
TSCA 153B 1.71% 0.21% 0.00%
TSCA 153 1.09% 0.00% 0.00%
EPCRA 311 1.00% 0.89% 0.00%
EPCRA 312 0.89% 2.53% 0.12%
TSCA 8 0.38% 0.29% 0.00%
TSCA 15 0.24% 1.21% 0.31%
RCRA 3008 0.21% 0.27% 0.74%
RCRA 3002A 0.15% 0.00% 0.00%
CERCLA 103A 0.12% 1.70% 0.68%
RCRA 3005 0.12% 1.11% 1.05%
CAA 111E 0.06% 0.07% 0.25%
CAA 7470 0.06% 0.00% 0.00%
CAA 609C 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
CWA 301 0.03% 11.03% 4.38%
CWA 301A 0.03% 2.31% 1.05%
TSCA 151C 0.03% 0.33% 0.18%
TSCA 6E 0.03% 1.41% 0.25%
13
Laws and Sections Violated in the Admin Docket Laws and Sections Violated in the Civil Docket
Law Section Admin Civil Audit Law Section Civil Admin Audit
CWA 301 11.03% 4.38% 0.03% CERCLA 107A 22.56% 0.16% 0.00%
EPCRA 313 4.82% 0.86% 12.34% CERCLA 107 7.64% 0.29% 0.00%
SDWA 1412 4.30% 0.31% 0.00% CERCLA 106A 6.35% 0.86% 0.00%
SDWA 1414G 3.89% 0.06% 0.00% CAA 110 4.50% 0.52% 0.00%
RCRA 9006 2.90% 0.25% 0.00% CWA 301 4.38% 11.03% 0.03%
RCRA LUST 2.73% 0.43% 0.00% CAA 113 3.70% 0.77% 0.00%
EPCRA 312 2.53% 0.12% 0.89% CAA 111 2.90% 0.87% 0.00%
CWA 404 2.48% 1.54% 0.00% CAA 112 2.77% 2.40% 0.00%
CAA 112 2.40% 2.77% 0.00% CERCLA 106 2.65% 1.71% 0.00%
CWA 301A 2.31% 1.05% 0.03% CAA 114 1.79% 0.44% 0.00%
SDWA 1414 2.00% 0.25% 0.00% CERCLA 104000 1.73% 0.00% 0.00%
FIFRA 7C 1.96% 0.06% 0.00% CWA 402 1.66% 1.44% 0.00%
CWA 308 1.83% 0.37% 0.00% CERCLA 106B 1.54% 0.01% 0.00%
CERCLA 106 1.71% 2.65% 0.00% CWA 404 1.54% 2.48% 0.00%
CERCLA 103A 1.70% 0.68% 0.12% CWA 311 1.42% 1.51% 6.56%
CAA SUBCHP6 1.57% 0.18% 0.00% CERCLA 10400 1.23% 0.00% 0.00%
CWA 311 1.51% 1.42% 6.56% CERCLA 122 1.17% 0.41% 0.00%
CWA 402 1.44% 1.66% 0.00% RCRA 7003 1.17% 0.24% 0.00%
CAA 211 1.43% 0.12% 0.00% CAA 165 1.11% 0.02% 0.00%
TSCA 6E 1.41% 0.25% 0.03% CWA 309 1.11% 0.31% 0.00%
CERCLA 107C3 1.05% 0.01% 0.00%
Table 1C Table 1D
To get a sense of what these differences in laws and sections violated mean (and to preview
Table 2’s discussion of types of violations), note that Section 302 of EPCRA, the most prevalent
violation in the Audit docket, concerns notification of local authorities about potential risks.  The
second and third most commonly violated sections in the Audit data are EPCRA Section 313,
requiring submission of reports to the EPA and local agencies for the use and manufacture of
certain chemicals, and RCRA Section 3010 (A), requiring the submission of manifests for
hazardous waste transport.  Like violations of EPCRA Section 302, violations of EPCRA Section
313 and RCRA Section 3010 (A) are unlikely to involve actual emissions. In contrast, the most
commonly violated section in the Administrative docket, Section 301 of CWA, concerns the
discharge of pollutants into waters without express authorization (33 USC Sect 1311 et seq.).
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Comparing Types of Violations
That the violations uncovered by the Audit Policy are not of the same nature as those found
by EPA’s chosen, standard procedures is confirmed in Table 2’s comparison across violations
(recall, we applied EPA’s violation codes (see Appendix 2 for definitions) to the Audit cases).
Table 2A
Over 70% of Audit Policy violations are REP (“reporting”), while another 13% are TRI
(“Toxic Release Inventory”) and a further 6% are NONOTE (“failure to notify”) violations.  By
these figures alone, 90% of violations uncovered under the Audit Policy concern only reporting
or submitting, in one form or another, and do not directly concern actual emissions. The RCRA
violations of the REP violation type concern the failure properly to label hazardous wastes with
EPA ID numbers during transport, and the failure to submit a manifest to EPA agents so that
hazardous waste disposal can be properly tracked.  The TRI violations (which are violations of
the EPCRA law) stem from failures to update and submit a Toxic Release Inventory Form for
potentially hazardous chemicals that are legally used in industry.  Submission of this form allows
state and local officials to track firms’ manufacture and use of certain chemicals.
 Violations by Audit Docket frequency
Audit Admin Civil
REP 71.89% 14.21% 2.34%
TRI 13.25% 1.08% 0.12%
NONOTE 6.36% 2.40% 1.23%
FIFRA 4.69% 4.38% 0.98%
PMN 2.02% 0.30% 0.00%
IMP 0.59% 0.44% 0.12%
PRMTVL 0.47% 10.57% 7.26%
PCB 0.35% 0.95% 0.37%
SPILL 0.18% 1.39% 2.95%
PSD 0.06% 0.07% 2.58%
STR 0.06% 1.37% 2.21%
NOPRMT 0.03% 6.12% 6.15%
NORPTG 0.03% 1.77% 2.46%
STRAT 0.03% 1.49% 0.25%
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In the Administrative and Civil cases, less than 20% and 5% of the violations, respectively,
are REP, TRI or NONOTE.  More generally, for each violation type the fraction of Audit cases is
statistically significantly different from that type’s fraction of Administrative and Civil cases.20
                Table 2B                                                                Table 2C
While REP is the most common type of violation among Administrative cases, at 14%, the
next most common is PRMTVL (“permit violation”), at 10%, followed by EFF (“effluent”) and
NOPRMT (“discharge without a permit”) at over 6% each.  Also, PRMTVL (7%) and NOPRMT
(6%) rank second and third in the Civil rankings, while EMIS (“emissions”) is fourth, at 6 % as
well, and both NSPS (i.e., a violation of a “new source performance standard”) and NESHAP
(i.e., a violation of a “national emission standard for a hazardous air pollutant”) each make up
almost 5%.  The key point is that other than REP, these violations involve actual emissions.
                                                          
20 As above, for ANOVA in a regression context (i.e., docket dummies) comparing Audit to Administrative for the
major violation types, the lowest t statistic on docket difference is 3.0, next lowest is 10.8, and the average is 35.7.
Violations by Admin. Docket frequency   Violations by Civil Docket frequency
Admin Civil Audit Civil Admin Audit
REP 14.21% 2.34% 71.89% SIP 7.50% 0.35% 0.00%
PRMTVL 10.57% 7.26% 0.44% PRMTVL 7.26% 10.57% 0.44%
EFF 6.66% 4.18% 0.00% NOPRMT 6.15% 6.12% 0.03%
NOPRMT 6.12% 6.15% 0.03% EMIS 6.03% 0.54% 0.00%
FIFRA 4.38% 0.98% 4.69% OTHER 5.54% 4.35% 0.00%
OTHER 4.35% 5.54% 0.00% NSPS 4.92% 1.00% 0.00%
PWSM/R 4.04% 0.37% 0.00% NESHAP 4.55% 2.02% 0.00%
UST 3.66% 1.72% 0.00% EFF 4.18% 6.66% 0.00%
NONOTE 2.40% 1.23% 6.36% SPILL 2.95% 1.39% 0.18%
PLAN 2.40% 0.62% 0.00% AOVIOL 2.71% 1.61% 0.00%
GFR 2.33% 1.72% 0.00% DSP 2.71% 1.02% 0.00%
PWSNP 2.11% 0.49% 0.00% PSD 2.58% 0.07% 0.06%
NESHAP 2.02% 4.55% 0.00% NORPTG 2.46% 1.77% 0.03%
NORPTG 1.77% 2.46% 0.03% REP 2.34% 14.21% 71.89%
STORM 1.67% 0.00% 0.00% 404PMT 2.21% 1.60% 0.00%
AOVIOL 1.61% 2.71% 0.00% STR 2.21% 1.37% 0.06%
404PMT 1.60% 2.21% 0.00% GFR 1.72% 2.33% 0.00%
STRAT 1.49% 0.25% 0.03% PRETMT 1.72% 0.75% 0.00%
REC 1.46% 0.86% 0.00% UST 1.72% 3.66% 0.00%
PWSMCL 1.41% 0.25% 0.00% ASB 1.60% 1.10% 0.00%
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Fines as a Proxy for Severity
Tables 3A, 3B and 3C use average fines per violation to compare the severity of violations
across the three dockets.  Table 3A conveys very broad averages for each docket.  As shown,
Audit fines are the lowest (these are the proposed fines, not the lowered fines after Audit Policy
reductions). Given the total number of observations, this difference is statistically significant.21
                                  Table 3A -- average fines by docket
The averages in Table 3A suggest that the differences seen in Tables 1 and 2 correspond to
differences in the severity of the violations.  It is also worth checking whether violations under
the Audit Policy for any given law or section are more or less severe than those discovered under
standard enforcement practices.  Table 3B breaks the cases down by law, so that the severity of
more similar cases can be compared across the dockets.  For every law except CAA the severity
as indicated by fines per violation is lower for Audit cases than for Administrative cases. And for
CAA, there are so few Audit cases that the mean Audit fine, and thus also the difference in mean
fines, may well not be a good predictor of future Policy outcomes (statistically, note that the 95%
confidence interval around the difference in mean fines includes zero for CAA, which is not the
case for any other law, although CERCLA comes close again because of very few Audit cases).
                                                          
21 Recall (and see Appendix 3) that for multiple-violation cases we must apportion the single recorded fine value for
the case among the multiple violations.  We divide evenly for cases in which the multiple violations are all of the
same law (those plus single-violation cases are over 98% of cases; we are not comfortable doing the same division
for the multiple-law cases). If we use only single-violation cases, we find that these results are essentially the same.
This is a good place to note also that the docket-dissimilarity results above are robust to whether the multiple-
violation cases are dropped.  The qualitative results are very robust.  For instance, if the fractions in Table 1A are re-
computed using only the first violation in each record, those results and the ones in Table 1B remain.  Further, if the
same approach were taken for Table 2, still REP and TRI would be the violation types for over 70% of the cases in
the Audit Docket.  However, treating each violation separately, and counting them all, seems the better approach.
Docket Observations Mean Fine Std. Dev.
Civil 568 $527,236 2,107,117
Admin 10350 $17,800 101,968
Audit 1876 $5,674 8,554
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Table 3B -- average fines by law by docket
Recall from above (or see Appendix 3) that for cases with multiple violations of one law, we
divide the single fine value provided by the number of violations to get an average fine value.
The results above are robust to these multiple-same-law-violations being dropped.  Thus it is a
robust result that, even controlling for the laws violated (the distribution of these laws differs by
docket, a fact which underlies Table 3A), the Audit Policy seems to turn up less severe cases.
Table 3C then disaggregates Table 3B one step further, i.e. by law and section.  To keep the
table of manageable size, only the most commonly violated law sections per docket are listed
(with one table per docket, each of which lists the docket’s most common law sections violated).
Law Docket Obs. Mean Fine
EPCRA Audit 1046 $6,825
Admin 1522 $13,847
Civil 3 $35,845
RCRA Audit 312 $468
Admin 2012 $20,537
Civil 50 $740,725
TSCA Audit 228 $9,672
Admin 1259 $40,522
Civil 4 $14,788
FIFRA Audit 160 $5,000
Admin 1113 $10,055
Civil 8 $6,129
CWA Audit 118 $1,320
Admin 2085 $12,912
Civil (drop outliers) 130 $260,547
Civil 134 $607,993
CERCLA Audit 4 $0
Admin 220 $46,963
Civil 104 $40,102
CAA Audit 4 $49,658
Admin 1287 $14,121
Civil (drop outliers) 247 $270,832
Civil 255 $684,296




That cases with fines do not exist for the last, Audit column of the bottom two parts of the table
emphasizes the point from the tables above that the dockets contain different kinds of violations.
Focusing on the ten law/sections most commonly violated in Audit cases, each has lower
mean fines for Audit cases than for Standard cases, except for the last two sections, i.e. EPCRA
Sections 311 and 312.  Thus, generally, even within the set of violations that are most frequently
uncovered under the Audit Policy, the Audit Policy is catching relatively less severe violations.
The only types of cases for which Audit Policy violations are more severe concern reporting.
Table 3C
Law/Sections Violated by Audit Docket frequency
Law Section % Audit Avg. Audit Fine Avg. Admin Fine
EPCRA 302 58.03% $1,601 N/A
EPCRA 313 12.34% $13,103 $19,845
RCRA 3010A 8.95% $0 $14,256
CWA 311 6.56% $1,175 $5,021
FIFRA 12A1C 4.73% $5,000 $5,695
TSCA 5 3.22% $11,994 $35,820
TSCA 153B 1.71% $6,386 $15,343
TSCA 153 1.09% $3,676 N/A
EPCRA 311 1.00% $14,941 $9,531
EPCRA 312 0.89% $12,500 $7,244
Law/Sections Violated by Administrative Docket frequency
Law Section % Admin Avg. Admin Fine Avg. Audit Fine
CWA 301 11.03% $15,333 N/A
EPCRA 313 4.82% $19,845 $13,103
SDWA 1412 4.30% $2,192 N/A
SDWA 1414G 3.89% $1,300 N/A
RCRA 9006 2.90% $1,461 N/A
Law/Sections Violated by Civil Docket frequency
Law Section % Civil Avg. Civil Fine Avg. Audit Fine
CERCLA 107A 22.56% $56,079 N/A
CERCLA 107 7.64% $13,179 N/A
CERCLA 106A 6.35% $2,893 N/A
CAA 110 4.50% $307,824 N/A
CWA 301 4.38% $725,414 N/A
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Discussion
EPA’s Audit Policy appears to be serving quite a different function from what one might
have expected after reading the content of the policy and EPA publications touting its success.
The policy has not been acting as a substitute for EPA enforcement actions across the board.
Rather, its impact has been fairly contained to those violations involving the failure to report or
to keep records.  Major emissions violations—the bread and butter of EPA’s standard
enforcement actions—are not the kinds of violations that firms are volunteering to EPA.
What explains the distinctive character of the Audit Docket?  We discuss below a suite of
possible explanations.  As we note in our final summary, the key point is that until it can be
determined which of these explanations are the most important, whether and how best to change
the Audit Policy will remain unclear.  And until then, the Policy could even be detrimental.
Bad Deal:  The easiest explanation is that EPA’s offer of special dispensation for self-
reporters is simply not attractive enough to induce firms to participate.  But the bare assertion
that the Policy is a “bad deal” for firms does not explain the fact that self-reported violations
have been skewed towards less significant reporting and record-keeping violations.  If the Audit
Policy were a bad deal, we would expect to see few self-reported violations across the board.
Gravity Ratio:  Another explanation starts with the fact that EPA reduces only the gravity
component of fines for firms that have self-reported, still assessing in full the economic benefit
component of the fine—i.e., the dollar value of the economic benefit that the firm derived from
noncompliance. Therefore, the benefits of self-reporting are greatest for violations for which the
gravity penalty is the major component of the total penalty.  Examination of the firm’s decision
problem reveals that, given the share of the gravity component, the size of the total fine should be
of no consequence in determining whether the firm chooses to participate in the Audit Policy.
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Consider a violation with total fine F, the fraction x of which constitutes the gravity portion.
Imagine that the (risk neutral) firm believes there is a p chance that EPA will detect the violation
on its own, if the firm does not self-report. Assuming a 100% reduction in the gravity component
for self-reporting, the firm pays a fine of F(1-x), if it reports, and faces an expected fine of pF, if
it does not. Self-reporting is best when pF >F(1-x)  ⇔  x > (1-p).  Thus, self-reporting is best for
the firm only when the gravity portion of the fine exceeds the chance of going undetected.  The
overall fine F has no independent impact on the firm’s decision of whether to self-report.22
Thus, we would expect to find more self-reporting of violations for which x, the gravity
component of the fine, is relatively large compared to the economic benefit portion of the fine.
Unfortunately, data currently provided by EPA do not permit computation of x.  Thus, it is not
possible for us systematically to test the correlation between x and the chance of self-reporting.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the gravity portion of total fines would be relatively
large for violations that involve the failure to report or record information—the bulk of the Audit
Policy violations.  Economic benefits from failing to report would appear to be relatively slight,
consisting mainly of savings in monitoring costs, clerical costs, and legal fees.  In contrast, the
cost savings from not preventing emissions, e.g., not replacing pollution control equipment, not
properly treating waste water before releasing it into a nearby estuary, or not taking expensive
precautions required for the handling of hazardous substances, are likely to be significant.
Furthermore, if the Audit Policy violations are less severe, as we suggest, it is relevant that
the factors that EPA uses to determine the gravity component of fines include a number of
                                                          
22 If firms audit and report more when the reduceable, gravity component is greater, one might suggest making the
entire fine reduceable, including the economic benefit portion.  However, allowing firms to capture even part of the
economic benefit of non-compliance that accrues until self-disclosure would create a perverse incentive to put off
remedying violations found.  If they could time their self-reporting to precede EPA’s own detection, firms might
even have an incentive to plan regular, temporary, cost-saving violations. If it knew EPA evaluated its smokestack
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dimensions that do not appear to be proportional to the severity of the violation.  These include
the size of the violator, the extent to which the violator fell short of the requirement,23 the general
presence of compliance problems in the region,24 and whether “the violator already has instituted
expeditious remedies to the identified violations prior to the commencement of litigation.”25
Moreover, EPA policy calls for routine imposition of a “non-trivial” gravity component on top of
the economic benefit fine to insure proper deterrence.26  For less severe violations, these types of
“fixed cost” elements could make the gravity component higher than one might otherwise expect.
What evidence there is on the relationship between self-reporting and the relative size of the
gravity component in potential penalties seems to confirm our conjecture that these are positively
correlated across violations.  In the GTE case touted by the EPA, for example, the economic
                                                                                                                                                                                          
emissions every December, a firm might rationally turn off its scrubber every January and “shamefacedly discover”
that fact the next November, thus receiving fine amnesty for self-reporting and achieving cost savings via violation.
23 According to the EPA:  “In quantifying the gravity of a violation…the following factors should be considered:
     1) Actual or possible harm:  This factor focuses on whether (and to what extent) the activity of the defendant
actually resulted or was likely to result in an unpermitted discharge or exposure; 2) Importance to the regulatory
scheme: This factor focuses on the importance of the requirement to achieving the goal of the statute or regulation.
For example, if labelling is the only method used to prevent dangerous exposure to a chemical, then failure to label
should result in a relatively high penalty. By contrast, a warning sign that was visibly posted but was smaller than
the required size would not normally be considered as serious.  3) Availability of data from other sources: The
violation of any recordkeeping or reporting requirement is a very serious matter. But if the involved requirement is
the only source of information, the violation is far more serious. By contrast, if the Agency has another readily
available and cheap source for the necessary information, a smaller penalty may be appropriate (e.g., a customer of
the violator purchased all the violator's illegally produced substance. Even though the violator does not have the
required records, the customer does). 4) Size of violator: In some cases, the gravity component should be increased
where it is clear that the resultant penalty will otherwise have little impact on the violator in light of the risk of harm
posed by the violation. This factor is only relevant to the extent it is not taken into account by other factors.”  See
14 ELR at 30007 [emphasis added]
24 14 ELR at 30001 (“In some classes of cases, the normal gravity calculation may be insufficient to effect general
deterrence. This could happen if, for example, there was extensive noncompliance with certain regulatory programs
in specific areas of the United States. This would demonstrate that the normal penalty assessments had not been
achieving general deterrence. In such cases, the case development team should consider increasing the gravity
component sufficient to achieve general deterrence.”)
25 14 ELR at 30002
26 14 ELR at 30002 (“EPA typically should seek to recover, at a minimum, a penalty which includes the benefit
component plus some non-trivial gravity component. This is important because otherwise, regulated parties would
have a general economic incentive to delay compliance until the Agency commenced an enforcement action. Once
the Agency brought the action, the violator could then settle for a penalty less than their economic benefit of
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benefit component of GTE’s fine for failing to report sulfuric acid filled batteries was only
$52,264.  In contrast, the gravity component, from which GTE was excused as a result of self-
reporting, was $2.38 million, or 98% of the total fine (EPA March 1998).  Similarly, in five of
the seven other Audit cases for which we have the economic-benefit fine value in EPA’s data,
this component was 2% or less of the total fine (the other two were 1/3 and 2/3 of the total).
Mandatory Reporting Requirements:  A third explanation concerns the mandatory reporting
requirements built into emissions-based statutes such as the Clean Water Act27 and the Clear Air
Act.28  Under these reporting requirements, firms are required to actively monitor and to report to
EPA on effluent discharges and the like.  Perhaps such mandatory reporting requirements crowd
out the kind of voluntary reporting that would fall under the Audit Policy.
Firms may already be conducting an exhaustive investigation of potential emissions points
as a result of these reporting requirements.  If so, perhaps this means that they are unlikely to find
anything new from investigative efforts they expend over and above what is already required.
And even if they do find something in their supra-mandatory investigation, they may not expect
to get a break for reporting newly found emissions violations that were supposed to be revealed
in a mandatory report.  This might explain the relative scarcity of self-reporting under the Audit
Policy for emissions violations under statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.
That explanation, however, is not entirely consistent with our data.  In the first place, we do
see emission violations in both of the standard dockets.  This would indicate that the mandatory
monitoring and reporting is not catching everything.  Secondly, we do see emissions violations in
the audit docket, indicating that additional auditing does yield additional violations.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
noncompliance. This incentive would directly undermine the goal of deterrence.”)
27 33 USC § 1318 (2001) .
28 42 USC § 7413(c)(2) (2001) .
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Finally, if violations to which the reporting requirements apply are dominating the results,
we might expect the audit docket to show a large number of cases with coupled emissions and
reporting violations.  For instance, a firm that has belatedly discovered an emissions problem that
should have been disclosed under mandatory reporting requirements could apply for Audit Policy
treatment for both the emissions violation and the corresponding violation of the mandatory
reporting requirements.  Were this the case, it would help to explain the disproportionately large
fraction of reporting violations in the audit docket.  A given emissions violation would be more
likely to be paired with a corresponding reporting violation in the audit the docket than in either
of the standard dockets.  But this explanation is not consistent with the data, given that most of
the reporting cases within the audit docket are for single violations.  Furthermore, when there are
cases with multiple violations, they do not clearly match the suggested pattern.
Superfluous Disclosure Requirements:   Yet another explanation of the patterns that we have
observed is based on the preconditions EPA imposes on fine reduction, which include disclosure.
Depending on firms’ preferences regarding disclosure (and the possibility that their disclosures
could be used against them in suits brought by private parties), the disclosure requirement could
be an extra filter biasing Audit cases towards reporting.  But, as two of us have argued elsewhere,
fine reduction need not be tied to a firm’s disclosure to the EPA.29  Effective fine reduction for
self-audited violations could address the disincentive issue simply by reducing fines to the extent
that a firm’s self-investigation aided in detecting a violation.  Thus, EPA could correct incentives
by discounting fines to such an extent that expected fines—taking into account the increased
probability of detection resulting from self-auditing—remain roughly constant whether or not a
firm has audited.  If this were the policy, firms would have nothing to lose from self-auditing
                                                          
29 Pfaff, A.S.P. and C.W. Sanchirico (2000).  “Environmental Self-Auditing:  Setting the Proper Incentives for
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across all potential violations, not just those that they would not mind admitting to EPA.
Red Herring:   A final explanation for the “small fry” nature of the Audit docket violations
could be that firms are trying to use the Audit Policy strategically.  It is tempting to speculate that
at least a few firms have decided to try to use self-reported minor violations in order to distract
EPA’s attention from unreported major violations.  In other words, the small fries we see may
specifically be red herrings.  Thus, a firm might happily bring to EPA its 600 reporting and
recording violations, in the hope that this “bounty” will occupy the attention and partly satisfy the
‘enforcement appetite’ of the local EPA office and/or national enforcement officials, in the
process directing regulatory attention away from real environmental risks at a local plant.
A Need For Change?  Whatever the explanation for the limited nature of disclosures up to
this point under the EPA’s Audit Policy, one might argue that the policy is still serving a useful
purpose.  When firms turn themselves in even for minor violations, the argument might run, this
frees up EPA resources to tackle major violations.  But given the possibility that self-reported
violations are red herrings, as just discussed, this is dubious consolation.  If, for example, many
firms are successfully strategic, the Audit Policy may actually be detracting from the EPA’s
preferred allocation of resources.  Generally, without an Audit Policy the EPA is free to decide
for itself what violations to focus on, much the way a prosecutor decides what suspects to
criminally prosecute.  With a “small fry” Audit Policy, however, EPA is obliged to deal with all
the minor violations that firms bring to it.  This may cause a less than beneficial reallocation of
resources, just as a prosecutor may have less time to investigate homicides when she is obliged to
respond to every confession, however minor, brought in from the neighborhood.
Thus, we can not even be assured that the EPA’s current Audit Policy is at worst harmless.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm”.  Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 16(1):189-208.
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Accordingly, more research indicating precisely why the Audit Policy is of such starkly different
character is of prime importance.  Without additional understanding of why the Audit Policy has
produced the outcomes is has, it is not possible to recommend with confidence how to improve
those outcomes.  And in the meantime, the policy could be doing more harm than good.
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APPENDIX 1  --  descriptions of laws and law/sections
Clean Air Act (CAA):  enacted in 1970 (and amended in both 1977 and 1990), it is the
comprehensive Federal law that regulates air emissions from area, stationary and mobile sources.
It gives EPA the right to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to protect
public health and the environment. The goal of the Act was to set and achieve NAAQS in every
state by 1975.  The act was amended in 1990 in order to address related problems such as acid
rain, ground-level ozone (smog), stratospheric ozone depletion and air toxics.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA):
commonly known as the Superfund Act, it was enacted in 1980 in order to establish prohibitions
and requirements concerning uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites.  It also provided
for the liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous wastes at these sites and
established a trust fund to provide for cleanup when no responsible party could be identified.
Clean Water Act (CWA): the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
as amended in 1977, which set the basic structure for regulating discharges of pollutants to
waters of the United States. The law gave EPA the right to set effluent standards on an industry
basis and continued the requirements to set water quality standards for all contaminants in
surface waters.  The CWA makes it illegal for any person to discharge any pollutant from a non-
stationary source into navigable waters unless a permit is obtained under the Act.
Emergency Planning and Community Right to know Act (EPCRA): enacted in 1986 (as
part of SARA) to be the national legislation on community safety.  EPCRA was designed to
protect public health, safety, and the environment from chemical hazards. Under EPCRA, firms
must inform local emergency planning committees (LEPC) and the state emergency response
commission (SERC) of the hazardous chemicals they are using.  The EPA determines the criteria
for hazardous chemicals. EPCRA also requires companies to disclose to these local agencies as
well as to the EPA of any new or unknown chemicals they are using or creating.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA): enacted in 1972 to provide
federal control of pesticide distribution, sale and use, it gives EPA authority to require users of
pesticides to register when purchasing pesticides.  The EPA licenses all pesticide use in the US.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA): enacted in 1976 (and amended in
both 1984 and 1986), it gives EPA the right to control the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, and disposal of hazardous waste (but not for abandoned or historic sites; see CERCLA).
The HSWA amendments in 1984 require phasing out land disposal of hazardous wastes.
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA): established in 1974 to protect the quality of drinking
water in the US.  This law focuses on all waters actually or potentially designed for drinking use.
The Act gives EPA the right to establish safe standards of water purity and to require all owners
or operators of public water system to comply with primary (health-related) standards.
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA): enacted in 1976, gave EPA the ability to track the
75,000 industrial chemicals produced or imported into the US, and to ban the manufacture and
import of chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk.  The EPA repeatedly screens these chemicals
and can require reporting or testing of those that may pose environmental or health hazards.
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Section # Section Description
CAA 
110 Implementation plans
111 Standards of performance for new stationary sources
112 National emission standards for hazardous air pollutants
113 Federal enforcement
609 Servicing of motor vehicle air conditioners
CERCLA
106 Superfund cleanup by potentially responsible parties
107 Strict liability and cost recovery
CWA
301 Point source distribution of pollutants
311 Hazardous materials/minimum reporting requirements
404 Discharge of dredged or fill materials
EPCRA
Subtitle A Emergency Planning and Notification
301 Establishment of State commissions, planning districts, and local committees
302 Substances and facilities covered and notification
303 Comprehensive emergency response plans
304 Emergency notification
305 Emergency training and review of emergency systems
Subtitle B Reporting Requirements
311 Material safety data sheets
312 Emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms
313 Toxic chemical release forms
FIFRA
7C Pesticide producing establishment reporting requirement
MPRSA
101 Transportation of materials for ocean dumping
RCRA
3002 Hazardous waste generation
3003 Hazardous waste transportation
3005 Hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
3010 Notification of hazardous waste activity
9006  LUST Compliance & Penalty Order        
SDWA
1412 National drinking water regulations
1414 Monitoring of local water safety regulators
TSCA
5 Premanufacturing notification of chemical substances
8 Reporting and retention of information
13 Toxic substances importation (entry from other countries)
15 Toxic substance storage and disposal
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APPENDIX 2  --  violation codes
Acronym Description
ACC Accreditation
ACORD CERCLA 104E Access order/case      
ARSN           Arsenic
ASB            Asbestos
CLO            Closure & post-closure plan
CON            Container
DSP           Disposal
EFF            Effluent
EMIS           Emissions
FIFRA          FIFRA      
FIN            Financial responsibility
GFR            General facility requirements
GRANT          P.L. 92-500 facility
GWM            Groundwater monitoring
IMP            Imports
IND            Industrial source
INFO           CAA/114 (Info)
IP             Interim prohibition violation
LBAN           Land ban
LDT            Land disposal & treatment
MPRSA          Marine Protection Research
  and Sanctuary Act
N/A            Not applicable
NESHAP         National Emission Standard
  for Hazardous Air Pollutant
NODMR          Failure to submit a Discharge
  Monitoring Report
NONOTE         Failure to notify
NOPRMT         Discharge without a permit
NORPTG        No reporting or monitoring
NSPS           New Source Performance Standard
NSR            New Source Review
OP            Opacity
PCB            Polychlorinated Biphenyl
PM             Particulate matter
PMN            Pre-manufacturing notice
PRETMT         Pretreatment
PRMTVL         Permit violation
PSD            Prevention of significant
   deterioration
Acronym Description
PWSM/R         PWS monitoring/reporting
PWSMCL         PWS maximum containment level
PWSNP          PWS notification to public
PWSSA          PWS sampling & analyzing
REC            Required records maintenance
REP            Reporting violations
SIP  State implementation plan
SIPA1               SIP - A1 Source
SIPA2               SIP - A2 Source
SIPB           SIP - B Source
SLUDGE         Sludge
SPILL               Spill
STR            Storage
TRI            Toxic release inventory
  (Section 313)
TRT            Treatment
UIC            Underground Injection Control
  (SDWA)
UICCAC         UIC Casing and cementing
UICMFL         Fluid movement in underground
  source of drinking water
UICMIN         Mechanical integrity
UICMON         Monitoring
UICNPA         No approved plugging and
   abandonment plan
UICOIN         Injection between outermost casing
UICPRS         Injection beyond authorized
   pressure
UICUNI         Unauthorized injection
UICUNO         Unauthorized operation of a
  Class IV well
UICVPA         Compliance with plugging
  & abandonment plan
UST            Leaking underground storage tank
VHAP           Volatile hazardous air pollutants
VOC            Volatile organic compound
WKPR      Work practices (Asbestos D/R)




APPENDIX 3  --  from data sources to tables
EPA’s Standard Docket: raw text to spreadsheet
The EPA provides data for the Standard Docket, which has two parts (Administrative and
Civil), in the form of zipped files which themselves contain text files (containing fixed width
fields).  The zipped files we received were admin1.zip, admin2.zip, civil1.zip, and civil2.zip.
The text files contained within the zip files were casename.adm, readme.adm, defname.adm,
facname.adm, casename.civ, readme.civ, defname.civ, and facname.civ.  We utilized only the
‘casename’ files. When either of these files is opened into a spreadsheet program such as Excel,
each fixed width field is converted into a column (although this is not as automatically perfect a
process as would be useful, such that checking the results of this conversion seems necessary).
For each record, the following fields are in the casename.adm file:
Docket Number (this is a unique identifier for each record)
Case Name
Law (actually 5 fields here, for each of up to 5 violations within one record)
Section   (again up to 5), Violation (again up to 5),  Pollutant (again up to 5)





The casename.civ file includes the same fields as those listed above, with the exceptions:
Date Issued is replaced with Date Filed
Date Final Order Issued is replaced with Date Concluded
There is an additional field: Judicial District
Using the Docket Number, we discarded Standard cases for before 1994, to match the Audit
data.  This was achieved by extracting the year (in the middle of the field) from the Docket
Number, sorting the list by Year, and keeping only those with years 1994 or above.  We detail
this process for year identification because it differs from using the Date Issued or Date Final
Order Issued. The resulting Excel spreadsheets were saved as admindoc.xls and civildoc.xls.
EPA’s Audit Docket: hardcopy to spreadsheet
These data were provided to us in hardcopy form, specifically as copies of the documents in the
audit policy case files for 1994 (the program’s inception) to 1999. We entered information from
these documents into Excel.  Specifically, we summarized the information on the violation as
well as the law and section violated.  Also, we created a violation code by using our judgement
to apply EPA’s violation codes to these cases after reading all the information provided.  While
this did not seem very difficult, it is worth noting that we had to create these codes, since we
analyze them within Tables 2.  The resulting Excel spreadsheet was saved as AuditDoc.xls.
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Both Dockets: from spreadsheet to Stata and analyses for tables
The above three Excel files (admindoc.xls, civildoc.xls and auditdoc.xls) were converted into
Stata format using StatTransfer.  Thus Stata datasets are created which include information on at
least each record’s law, section, and violation as well as the proposed and the assessed penalties.
One important issue is that for the Standard data there are blank cells in the Excel spreadsheet
(following from the raw text files) for about half of the records’ fine levels.  To the extent that
fines can indicate severity of violations, which is the interpretation we give to our Table 3, it is
important to understand what a blank means here.  If it is equivalent to a zero, then it indicates
low severity.  If it indicates a different approach by the EPA to achieving its goals, other than
through fines, then it is not clearly correlated with severity at all.  In part as a result of
conversations with EPA Docket personnel, we believe that we should not assume blank fines
indicate zero fines levels.  However, we test our conclusions for robustness to this choice.
Table 1A -- Distribution of Violations by Law, comparing the Dockets
From the Standard data, again, data from before 1994 were discarded. This was to improve
comparison with the Audit data, which exists only from 1994 onward.  Recall that each case, or
record, can include multiple violations, up to five (this is less common in the Audit docket, with
more than one violation appearing in less than ten percent of the cases).  We count by violation,
i.e. if a single law is listed as being violated five times, that counts as five separate violations.
Thus, our total number of violations is significantly greater than the total number of cases.
The percentages by docket by law in the table are the number of violations of a given law
(calculated as just described) in a given docket over all violations in the docket. Note that some
variations were done to test robustness, including removing from the pool all violations linked
to CERCLA 106 and 107 (this includes sections 106, 106A, 106B, 107, 107A, 107C3, 107L;
for multiple violation cases, the entire case was dropped, i.e. violations of other laws in that
record were not counted) and recalculating the percentages.  This affects the pool for the Civil
part of the Standard Docket (739 of 1622 total violations dropped), and to a lesser extent also
the Administrative (635 of 19731 violations).  We also tried eliminating all CERCLA cases,
which in Civil meant 843 of 1622 total violations and in Administrative meant 1374 of 19731.
Tables 1B/C/D -- Distribution of Violations by Law/Section, comparing the Dockets
Using the same data, further analysis split each law violated into its particular sections, and
then the section percentages were calculated by dividing the total number of violations of any
individual section by the total number of sections violated (same as the total number of laws
violated, i.e. number of violations).  These data were arranged by percentages in three ways:  in
order of frequency in the Audit Docket, with Standard frequencies to compare; by the frequency
in the Standard Administrative data, with Audit data frequencies to compare; and by frequency
in the Standard Civil data, with Audit data frequencies to compare.  These calculations were
then also redone excluding CERCLA sections 106 and 107 and excluding all of CERCLA.
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Tables 2 -- Distribution of Violations by  Type, comparing the Dockets
Violations codes were created for the Audit docket by looking at law/section violated, the
proposed penalties, and the description of the violation, and then choosing the violation code
that matched best, from the codes used by the EPA in the Standard docket.  Thus, we had to
create this “data” in order to compare the types of violations across dockets. Again, the total
violations were summed, and multiple violations were counted as multiple instances.  Violations
in the standard docket with no violation code were discarded. Percentages were calculated
within each docket by dividing the total number of instances of an individual violation code by
the grand total of violations.  The data were arranged by frequency within each of the Dockets.
Note that when this is redone without CERCLA 106 & 107 and without all of CERCLA,
despite the importance of CERCLA in at least the Standard Civil data the results here were not
substantially different from above.  This is due to an anomaly in the data furnished by EPA:
CERCLA 106 and 107 cases have a lot of missing violation codes, and were dropped above.
For instance, in the Civil data over half the violations have violation type codes, while for the
CERCLA data only 40 of 843 violations have violation type codes, i.e. the rest are missing.
And in the Administrative data, about 80% of the approximately 20,000 violations have
violation type codes, but in the 1374 CERCLA violations only 353 violations have codes.
Table 3A -- Mean Fines, comparing the Dockets
In analyzing fines, we must consider what to do with cases containing more than one
violation (in the Audit docket, 5%; Civil docket, 38%; Admin docket, 12%). The reason is that
only one fine is provided per case, and thus we must ourselves somehow apportion that single
fine among the violations (up to five) included in that case.   We take two approaches to this.
First, we consider only the single-violation cases.  Second, we consider the single-violation
cases plus the multiple-violation cases in which only one law was violated, albeit multiple
times.  It seems reasonable to divide the fine by the number of violations in that situation. But
we did not fee comfortable doing so when different laws were violated within the same case.
Fortunately, the latter situation is uncommon within these datasets.
The Audit docket contains both proposed and final penalties, because due to the Audit
Policy penalties of course can be lowered.  The proposed penalty before reduction under the
Policy seems the better indicator of severity. The standard docket contains an Assessed Penalty
and Cost Recovery.  We used only the Assessed Penalty.  For either of the dockets, the number
of violations and violations actually fined (i.e., number of violations with a recorded positive
fine) were totaled.  Then the sum of all the penalties for all violations was totaled.  The data are
shown typically as a ratio, mean fine per violation, sometimes with violation and fine totals.
Tables 3B and 3C -- Mean Fines by Law and Law/Section, comparing the Dockets:
Table 3B shows the same data summarized in Table 3A, but broken down by law.  Then
Table 3C shows the same data again, but broken down by law/section, for particular sections.
Again, we checked the robustness of the single-violation results using multiple-violation cases.
